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## LITERATURE

*Essai sur les passions*, par TH. RIBOT. Felix Alcan, Paris, 1907. pp. 192.

This essay completes the series on affective states, of which "La psychologie des sentiments" and "La logique des sentiments" are the earlier volumes. The book contains four chapters, the first of which discusses the question, what is a passion, the second and third the genealogy of the passions, while the fourth is devoted to an analysis of how passions terminate. The author makes no claim of offering an exhaustive treatise on the passions but rather a monographic study based on modern methods of research. He thinks that the term passion has wrongly fallen into disuse in psychology and is needed to differentiate a distinct phase of affective life which otherwise must be classified under emotion, although it differs from emotion by distinct characteristics. As a convenient mode of classification Ribot groups the affective states into three classes: (1) Affective states or feelings, properly so-called, under which he includes all agreeable or disagreeable states which express the needs and appetites inherent in our psychophysical organism, which constitute the content of our ordinary every day experience. (2) Emotions, which are characterized by a sudden onset, a break in the equilibrium of ordinary consciousness. The author defines an emotion as a sudden reaction of the egoistic instincts, motor in its nature, involving always movement or arrest of movement and characterized by intensity and brevity. (3) Passion, which is a prolonged and intellectualized emotion. The latter is primary and crude, the former is secondary and more complex. It is characterized by the presence of a fixed idea, duration and intensity. Through the fixed idea, it involves association and dissociation, creative imagination and the logical function. Everything in harmony with the fixed idea is called up by association, everything inharmonious is dropped into the background of consciousness, thus preparing the way for the imagination, which idealizes the object of passion. The chief operation of the logical function is in the judgment of values. There are two types of passions, those in which the motor (affective) element is the stronger and those in which the relation is reversed. The latter are the more enduring.

The second section, which deals with the genealogy of the passions, is prefaced by the statement that although we have numerous works under the title, Physiology of the Passions, we, nevertheless, have no physiology of passions considered as special manifestations of the affective life, since a general knowledge of the physiological conditions underlying the affective life is entirely inadequate to explain the specific and necessary conditions of individual passions. Such conditions, especially in the more intellectual passions, must, of necessity, be exceedingly complex. The author, however, considers it necessary to distinguish two levels, one corresponding to the higher and the other to the lower elements of passion; the first to unconscious or subconscious factors, and the latter to conscious states. There are three fundamental tendencies in correspondence to which all passions may be classified into three groups—those which are directly connected with the conservation of the individual, gluttony and drunk-

eness; with the preservation of the species, love; and with the tendency of the individual to self-expansion (Nietzsche's will to power). The birth of a passion is conditioned by both external and internal stimuli, only the latter of which can be considered as true causes. The outer stimuli are environment, which favors the development of the germinal tendency, imitation, and suggestion, which is really a form of imitation. The internal causes are the physiological constitution of the individual, his temperament and character.

Although there are many tendencies which express needs connected with the conservation of the individual, it is only out of hunger and thirst that actual passions can develop.

The physical basis of passion tending to the preservation of the species is a purely mechanical, conscious or unconscious, attraction between two individuals, whose normal form is a synthesis of homogeneous tendencies, and therefore enduring, while those forms of love which contain heterogeneous tendencies, as, for example, jealous love, are more likely to be unstable.

The passions which are based on the tendency to expansion or "will to power" are sub-divided into those based on sympathy, those which involve conquest and those which are destructive in their nature. The first form is productive of but few passions, of which the extreme type of maternal love is the complete example, and the author devotes but a short section to its discussion.

The second group is of more importance and includes many apparently diverse passions, gambling, ambition, avarice, etc.

The third group has, as its general basis, antipathy, and comprises the destructive passions, hate, of which vengeance is the final form of expression, and the different forms of jealousy.

There is, further, a group of passions which, though not universal, do not differ in their essential characteristics from the preceding groups. These are the æsthetic, the religious and the political passions.

The basis of the æsthetic feeling, Ribot finds in the instinct of play, here following the theory of Groos. The æsthetic passion arises whenever art is recognized as an absolute good. It is, according to Ribot, stronger in the amateur and art lover than in the creative artist.

The religious passion expresses itself in both active and passive forms, the latter being represented by mysticism and asceticism, and the former by missionary zeal and fanatical persecution. At the basis of the active forms lie in the one case altruistic tendencies, sympathy with unbelievers and overflow of energy, in the other antipathy toward the unbelievers.

The political passion is based on the social instinct, and there are two types, the realistic, in which personal ambition comes into play, and the idealistic, which is less egoistic, tends toward mysticism, and the passion resembles a moral imperative.

Patriotism may also be a passion but is less complex than the political passion and may even be opposed to it though it is grounded on the social instinct.

The moral sentiment may become a passion which expresses itself in two forms, namely, by propaganda and by action.

Besides these passions there is a group which the author designates as "petites passions," but these are so characterized because of the comparative insignificance of their objects since they are often as intense as the great passions. Such are bibliomania and the various forms of the collecting passion.

The fourth and last chapter of the book is devoted to the discussion of how passions terminate.

The author gives a brief outline of the development of passions, which vary in their details, according to the nature of each passion. But all passions are of slow growth and for the most part developed before they are fully present in consciousness. Without entering into any discussion of their unconscious or subconscious growth, which, however, Ribot regards as a probable hypothesis, there are present in consciousness fragmentary tendencies, scattered and perhaps of momentary duration, which are, nevertheless, all directed toward the same end, namely, attraction or repulsion for a person, object or idea. These movements of advance or recoil follow the law of nervous excitation and are cumulative in their action so that though passions sometimes seem to arise suddenly, the suddenness is only apparent. Through the accumulation all the various tendencies and judgments of value the passion is formed and this takes place as soon as a dominant idea recognized as such is present.

A passion may terminate in five ways: (1) by weariness or satiety; (2) by transformation into another passion having a common basis; (3) by substitution; (4) by insanity; (5) by death. Since physiological processes of stimulation underlie all passions and these, according to Ribot's views, are also present even when the consciousness is not ruled by the passion, it follows that the more intense is the physiological excitement the more easily can weariness or satiety occur. The termination of a passion indicates that the physiological excitability no longer exists. This may occur in consequence of physical weakness due to illness, exhaustion or old age. Habituation is not an essential element in passion. As an accessory factor it may be indifferent, useful or harmful. In a true passion the rôle of habituation is only an apparent value. Since the stability of passion has its root in the underlying tendencies of attraction or repulsion, its persistence depends not upon the nature of the passion but on that of the individual.

A passion may terminate by transformation into another which has a common basis. This is only an apparent end and is dependent upon two conditions, a surplus of energy, which has need of expression, or the appearance of a new directive idea. The most frequent examples of this type are the transformation of human love into love of the divine or religious into political fanaticism, or a passion may change to its opposite, as love to hate. Here the fixed idea does not change but there is an inversion of its value.

The substitution of a passion in place of one totally different happens but rarely. The problem of substitution is complex and has various aspects. In some cases the dominant passion appears to depend upon age, *e. g.*, the ruling passions in infancy are the nutritive, in youth love, in adult life ambition, in old age avarice. Again, there are men of a single passion, but more frequently men of many passions either co-existent or successive, and the dominance of one of these may give an illusory appearance of substitution or among the many tendencies a true passion may arise.

A passion may end in insanity, and the question naturally arises as to whether passion itself may not be a pathological state and how the fixed idea of passion may be distinguished from that of insanity. The chief mark of distinction in the fixed idea lies in the fact that in the abnormal form the idea may be not only undesired but oppressive and repugnant, while the fixed idea of passion is desired and cherished. In general, the author concludes that there is no one characteristic by which passion may be distinguished from insanity, but each case must be considered in its entirety. Every passion may end in death. Some, like gluttony and drunkenness, carry this tendency within

themselves. Others, like the passion for gambling, adventure and ambition, may lead to it, through external circumstances.

As a whole, the book is interesting, clear in its outline, and suggestive, as are all the works of the author, yet one is left with a wish that the general relation of passion to the affective life had received a more fundamental treatment and that the rich stores of material in biography and pathology had been drawn upon more extensively.

THEODATE L. SMITH.

*Der Gegenwärtige Stand der psychologischen Forschung*, von PROF. DR. C. GUTBERLET in Fulda. Philosophisches Jahrbuch, 21 Band, 1 Heft, S. 1-32.

This article follows the method and outlines of an earlier article by Stumpf, entitled "Richtungen und Gegensätze in der heutigen Psychologie," thus presenting the present status of psychology in the form of its numerous oppositions and conflicting points of view. These oppositions are of different degrees and vary greatly in importance. Briefly outlined they are as follows: An opposition exists between the psychological and the antipsychological or *a priori* points of view. According to the more moderate advocates of the psychological point of view, psychology is the foundation of only the mental sciences, but according to the stricter defendants it is fundamental to all science, and all judgments which are useful for life are by continuous habituation transformed into constraining propositions, and the *a priori* reduced a mental experience. Of somewhat less importance is the question whether psychology is to be considered a natural or a mental science and in direct relation to it, the question of whether a substantial substrate of mental activity must be assumed or whether this is an extraneous question and "psychology without a soul" answers all scientific demands.

Conflicting points of view also exist between Spiritualism and Materialism and between Substantialistic and Actualistic psychology, the latter being represented, not only by Wundt and his followers, but by all opponents of the doctrine of a substantial soul.

The advocates of psychophysical parallelism stand in opposition to the adherents of the doctrine of reciprocal action of mind and body. The parallelists as actualists can admit only states of consciousness as psychological material, since only these are actual while, on the other hand, some psychologists, of whom Lipps is representative, think that psychological processes lie more below than above the threshold of consciousness, only results of activities appearing in consciousness. Prof. Freud now believes that he has found an experimental method of studying the unconscious, which can be applied to hysteria and to dreams. Gutberlet thinks, however, that the expectations raised by Freud's method may be too optimistic, especially since the question involved is connected with Herbart's "freisteigenden Vorstellungen," which are now definitely set aside. Conflicting points of view also exist between Determinism and Indeterminism, and between purely Observational and Experimental psychology. Yet Wundt himself warns against an over doing of experimental methods and denounces especially such work as that of Bühler and Marbe who have sought to investigate processes of thought and judgment through questioning subjects and demanding self-introspection. These so called "Ausfrage" experiments he declares are no experiments at all and the observers have observed nothing.

Different methods of investigation also exist in Subjective and Objective psychology, the former being limited to introspection while the latter investigates the soul life of other beings and includes com-